70) and that how much metaphysics one should be willing to tolerate is fundamentally a matter of subjective tastes, values, and preferences, all of which are ultimately matters of voluntary choice.
93) from ‘empty metaphysical pursuits’ (p. In more detail-and among many other things-he sets out to do the following: first, more adequately articulate the structure of the relation that defines what it is for one claim to be ‘more’ metaphysical than another, with ‘naturalized’ metaphysics being thought of as some kind of virtuous middle ground, by implication this is to articulate naturalistic metaphysics itself second, make plausible the claim that everyone engaged in the philosophy of science routinely deploys ‘metaphysical inferences’ of some sort at least and hence has substantive metaphysical commitments, so that the only question is how far down the spectrum from an idealized ‘metaphysics-free’ limit they are third, convince us that there is no one objective point on this spectrum where we can ‘draw the line separating out aspects of putatively scientific ontology, worthy of belief’ (p. These, in any case, are just some of the ideas Chakravartty will defend in this rich and provocative new book.
And though he does not put words in our mouths regarding the consequences of this contention, presumably one of them is that it is time for us metaphysicians to let go of the eiderdowns and declare an amicable truce.
Moreover, once we put in the effort required to sharpen up the relevant terms, we will see that the very idea that there is some unequivocal ‘sweet-spot’ to be hit when it comes to respectable metaphysics is a fundamentally misguided notion. For to him, the very terms we naturalists deploy to describe this debate-for example, a metaphysics sufficiently ‘continuous with’ or ‘sensitive to’ science to be intellectually respectable-suffer from a ‘debilitating vagueness’ that makes the naturalistic critique ill-defined (p. While this is the sort of intellectual pillow-fight I myself find impossible to resist, it seems that Anjan Chakravartty will not be seduced into enlisting anytime soon. As such, only ours exhibits the right balance of a prioriand empirical content to be broadly deserving of intellectual respect. Ourmetaphysics, by contrast, is appropriately ‘continuous with’, ‘informed by’, and ‘sensitive to’ science, whose garments, it is taken to be generally understood, we are each obliged to fumble. Since at least the publication of Every Thing Must Go, we metaphysicians of science have claimed, both in print and in private, that analytic metaphysics is ‘irrelevant’, ‘frivolous’, ‘pseudoscientific’, ‘sterile or even empty’, and overall the embarrassing uncle of an otherwise functional philosophical family. While all parties can at least agree that metaphysics can constitute a meaningful activity ‘if done properly’, the latter faction have alleged, in no uncertain terms, that analytic metaphysicians are going about it the wrong way. Though I anticipate the usual grousing over whether, strictly speaking, this really qualifies as a law, the last decade of dispute between armchair and naturalistic metaphysicians would nevertheless seem to confirm it. According to Sayre’s law, ‘academic politics are so vicious precisely because the stakes are so small’.
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